We test between cooperative and extractive theories of the origins of government. We use river shifts in southern Iraq as a natural experiment, in a new archeological panel dataset. A shift away creates a local demand for a government to coordinate because private river irrigation needs to be replaced with public canals. It disincentivizes local extraction as land is no longer productive without irrigation. Consistent with a cooperative theory of government, a river shift away led to state formation, canal construction, and the payment of tribute. We argue that the first governments coordinated between extended households which implemented public good provision. (JEL D72, H11, H41, N45, N55, Q15)
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 306-309
Abstract:We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally 'switch' from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be 'trapped' at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions.
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 82, Heft 4, S. 571-594
Representative government, as every student of political science well knows, is now under fire. While it is not necessary to take too seriously the statements made by delirious purveyors of new remedies for old discontents, we cannot fail to take note of the fact that a strong tide of opinion has set in against this famous institution of democracy. On the continent of Europe, dictators either reject it entirely or seek to reduce it to purely advisory functions. In England, rumblings are heard to the effect that the Mother of Parliaments is not well herself; propositions for drastic changes come from members of the House of Commons; and if economic depression and unemployment continue for another ten years it is highly probable that some radical experiments will be made in the direction of concentrating economic powers. The United States is not without its troubles. When in the summer of 1931, with the deepening of the industrial crisis, it was urged that a special session of Congress be called to deal with national distress, President Hoover rather tartly rejected the petition and indicated that our great representative body was more likely to retard than to help "the process of recovery."
Intro -- Francois Guizot, The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe -- Front Matter -- Title Page -- Copyright Details -- Table of Contents, p. v -- Introduction to the Liberty Fund Edition, p. vii -- Editor's Note, p. xvii -- Preface, p. xviii -- Table of Contents, p. xxi -- Part I. Representative Institutions in England, France, and Spain, from the Fifth to the Eleventh Century -- Lecture 1 , p. 3 -- Lecture 2, p. 20 -- Lecture 3, p. 28 -- Lecture 4, p. 35 -- Lecture 5, p. 41 -- Lecture 6, p. 47 -- Lecture 7, p. 56 -- Lecture 8, p. 66 -- Lecture 9, p. 71 -- Lecture 10, p. 75 -- Lecture 11, p. 82 -- Lecture 12, p. 89 -- Lecture 13, p. 95 -- Lecture 14, p. 101 -- Lecture 15, p. 108 -- Lecture 16, p. 115 -- Lecture 17, p. 123 -- Lecture 18, p. 129 -- Lecture 19, p. 134 -- Lecture 20, p. 142 -- Lecture 21, p. 149 -- Lecture 22, p. 154 -- Lecture 23, p. 167 -- Lecture 24, p. 178 -- Lecture 25, p. 185 -- Lecture 26, p. 196 -- Part 2. Essays of Representative Government in England, from the Conquest till the Reign of the Tudors, p. 219 -- Lecture 1, p. 221 -- Lecture 2, p. 231 -- Lecture 3, p. 240 -- Lecture 4, p. 246 -- Lecture 5, p. 252 -- Lecture 6, p. 258 -- Lecture 7, p. 263 -- Lecture 8, p. 272 -- Lecture 9, p. 277 -- Lecture 10, p. 285 -- Lecture 11, p. 298 -- Lecture 12, p. 306 -- Lecture 13, p. 313 -- Lecture 14, p. 320 -- Lecture 15, p. 328 -- Lecture 16, p. 339 -- Lecture 17, p. 353 -- Lecture 18, p. 359 -- Lecture 19, p. 377 -- Lecture 20, p. 382 -- Lecture 21, p. 389 -- Lecture 22, p. 399 -- Lecture 23, p. 406 -- Lecture 24, p. 414 -- Lecture 25, p. 425 -- Index, p. 437.
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